题目：Information, Adaptation Costs and Bidding Behavior in Online Labor Markets
主讲人：李晓琳,Assistant Professor of Marketing,Naveen Jindal School of Management,University of Texas at Dallas
Online labor marketplaces are characterized by incomplete contracts, either due to inherent uncertainty surrounding these contracts or due to poor design. This incompleteness places an enormous burden on sellers to anticipate the ex post adaptations in contract specifications. Despite the prevalence of incompleteness in online contracts no paper has examined how sellers infer the costs associated with adaptation and whether these adaptation costs affect bidding behavior. In this paper, we focus on the role of two types of incompleteness that arise due to poor specification and complexity and ex post adaptation costs on ex ante bidding behavior. Our dataset from an online labor marketplace, in addition to information on bidding behavior contains unique information on ex post contractual outcomes and communication between buyers and sellers. We develop and estimate a structural model of strategic interaction between buyers and sellers in a multi-attribute auction to recover the underlying costs. Our results show evidence for significant adaptation costs in this context primarily due to incompleteness that arises from poor provision of information ex ante.