Leave the Lights Dimmed: How Less Information Improves Matching On A P2P Platform?

题目:Leave the Lights Dimmed: How Less Information Improves Matching On A P2P Platform?

时间:12月18日10:00-11:30

地点:商学院武东路校区106

演讲者:雷莹,助理教授,北京大学光华管理学院

摘要:We consider a two-sided matching scenario on a P2P platform. Each agent on one side, called ``senders'', sends an offer to an agent on the other side, called ``receivers''. A match is successful if a receiver accepts an offer. Both senders and receivers are differentiated in two dimensions, a vertical attribute like quality and a horizontal attribute like location. The utility from a match increases with vertical quality and decreases with horizontal distance for both senders and receivers. We compare equilibrium strategies and welfare when the platform displays only horizontal, only vertical or both horizontal and vertical information of senders and receivers, and show that hiding vertical information always weakly improves platform profit, but have different welfare effects for different types of agents.


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