Bayesian Persuasion and Mechanism Design by an Informed Seller

时间:12月17号14:00-15:30

地点:商学院武东路校区106

演讲者:Yanlin Chen, University of Technology Sydney

题目:Bayesian Persuasion and Mechanism Design by an Informed Seller

摘要:This paper investigates how a privately informed seller with binary quality can signal her type through Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design. Following the literature on the informed principal with common values, we fully characterize the RSW (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson) mechanism. We find that, in this mechanism, the low-type seller sells to the buyer with certainty and leaves zero surplus to the buyer. The high-type seller discloses to the buyer whether his value is above a cutoff, sets a price equal to the conditional expected value, and provides a nonnegative bonus for the trial. We then show that the RSW mechanism can always be supported as a PBE and its outcome turns out to be the unique PBE outcome under certain conditions. Finally, the RSW mechanism always survives the Intuitive criterion and is the unique one under certain conditions.


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