In many two-sided markets, stores vary in their strength to attract customers and thus the spillover effects to other stores, and platforms charge the stores different fees.

嘉宾简介:
罗茸,中国人民大学社会科学高等研究院(深圳)数字经济研究中心副主任、副教授。2015年于宾夕法尼亚州立大学获得经济学博士学位。2015年至2020年于美国佐治亚大学特里商学院担任助理教授。研究方向是产业组织经济学,现有研究主题涉及双边市场网络效应,消费者离散选择需求模型,企业动态定价,企业上下游合约,企业生产率估计,以及独家合约对二手房价的影响。研究成果发表在Management Science, International Economics Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy等期刊。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目,担任经济学期刊China Economic Review副编辑。
讲座摘要:
In many two-sided markets, stores vary in their strength to attract customers and thus the spillover effects to other stores, and platforms charge the stores different fees. In this paper, we set up a model of the consumer demand, the stores’ pricing game, and the bargaining between shopping malls and the stores, where the spillover effect directly affect the store-level number of customers. Using data on store-level rental contracts and customers for 15 shopping malls in Shanghai, we estimate the spillover effects provided by different types of stores and their bargaining power as a function of store type, store size, and contract duration. The results confirm heterogeneous spillover effects provided by different stores. We also find that the stores’ bargaining power increases with the store size and contract duration but decreases with the mall’s size. Our counterfactual analysis compares the equilibrium results of three types of vertical contracts, the revenue-sharing, fixed fee, and the maximum of the two.
