题目：What the Past Tells about the Future: Historical Prices in the Durable Goods Market
摘要：We investigate the dynamic pricing strategy of a durable good monopolist in a new setting that assumes away perfect consumer information on arrival time and historical prices. We first show that when consumers with heterogeneous tastes are all uninformed of historical prices, the monopolist charges a high price for most of the time and periodically holds low-price sales. Then we consider the case in which a small fraction of consumers become informed about historical prices (such as price tracker users). We find that in equilibrium the seller lowers the high price and keeps it for a shorter period in each price cycle. With the presence of price trackers, the monopolist profits less while consumer welfare increases. We contribute to the literature by illustrating the informational role of historical prices and understanding how price-tracking websites affect the market equilibrium. Our findings also provide microfoundations of price stickiness and have important managerial implications for sellers and platforms on historical price disclosure.